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David S. Tanenhaus: This afternoon's conversation with Professor Eric
Foner on Reconstruction, the Fourteenth Amendment, and Constitutional Inter-
pretation is a significant event in the life of our young and dynamic law school,
which has valued the importance of legal history since its inception. Today, we
are honored to discuss perhaps the most complicated chapter in American his-
tory, the Reconstruction Era, with its preeminent historian.
Professor Foner's monumental Reconstruction: America's Unfinished
Revolution, 1863-1877,2 is required reading for all serious students of Ameri-
can history and law. Professor Foner, an elected fellow of the American Acad-
emy of Arts and Sciences and the British Academy, is the DeWitt Clinton
Professor of History at Columbia University. He has been a prolific author
since the publication in 1970 of his first book, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free
Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War.3 Most
recently, he has published a textbook Give Me Liberty!: An American History
4
and the companion two-volume documentary reader, Voices of Freedom.' Ear-
lier this week, his Forever Free: The Story of Emancipation and Reconstruc-
tion, written with Joshua Brown, was published.6
Professor Foner has also played a leading role in furthering the historical
profession's mission to support the creation and dissemination of knowledge.
He is the former president of both the Organization of American Historians and
the American Historical Association. He also speaks throughout the United
States to high school and middle school teachers as part of the Teaching Ameri-
can History program.
Professor Foner has also made his mark in legal circles. The American
Bar Association recently awarded The Nation the Silver Gavel Award for an
issue featuring Professor Foner's lead article, with Randall Kennedy, "Brown
at 50."7 This award is given for outstanding efforts to foster public understand-
I David S. Tanenhaus, James E. Rogers Professor of History and Law, William S. Boyd
School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
2 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 (1988).
3 ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN
PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (1970).
4 ERIC FONER, I GIVE ME LIBERTY!: AN AMERICAN HISTORY (2004).
5 ERIC FONER, 2 VOICES OF FREEDOM: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (2004).
6 ERIC FONER & JOSHUA BROWN, FOREVER FREE: THE STORY OF EMANCIPATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION (2005).
7 THE NATION, May 3, 2004; available at http:l/www.thenation.com/doc/20040503/foner
kennedy (last visited Jan. 25, 2006).
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ing of the law. Professor Foner also served as an expert witness in the affirma-
tive action cases, Gratz v. Bollinger8 and Grutter v. Bollinger.
9
Before we begin today's conversation, I would like to thank the people
who have made this event possible. Professor Michael S. Green of the Com-
munity College of Southern Nevada, author of Freedom, Union and Power:
Lincoln and his Party in the Civil War, deserves special thanks for arranging
Professor Foner's visit to Las Vegas, including his talk this afternoon.10 In
addition, Deans Dick Morgan, Joan Howarth, Annette Appell, and Christine
Smith have all provided support for the event; and Professors Tom McAffee,
Sylvia Lazos, and Lynne Henderson all contributed questions for our distin-
guished speaker to consider. I" Finally, the advisors'" and editors of the
Nevada Law Journal have also worked hard on today's event.
The law faculty has asked Professor Foner to begin this afternoon's con-
versation by responding to questions about how his historical perspective and
sensibility can help us to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment. There is a bur-
geoning literature in the field of legal history on the differences between histor-
ical and legal methods of interpretations' 3, and we believe that today's
conversation will contribute to this larger, ongoing conversation between the
disciplines.
I am delighted to welcome Professor Foner to begin our conversation
about the most misunderstood period in American history, which produced the
most significant amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
Eric Foner: Thank you very much. I'm quite happy to be here. This is
billed as a conversation, but I do want to begin with a few thoughts that arise
out of the questions that were sent to me.
14
The thing to start with is that historians like myself are often very puzzled
by what seems to be a focus by many legal historians on the original intent of
the Fourteenth Amendment, or the original intent of anything in the Constitu-
tion. Now, on the one hand, historians are always trying to figure out original
intent. I mean part of our job is to figure out what people were thinking and
doing at the time: what their motivations were; what ideas went into the
actions they took. But the first point is that the question of original intent is a
political question. It is not a historical question.
Whether the Constitution should be interpreted according to original intent
is a political issue. Historians don't have an answer to that question, and as
citizens we may have thought about it but there's no particular reason historians
should know whether the Supreme Court should interpret things on the basis of
original intent or not. We do often find that the way that many, not all, legal
I Gratz v. Bollinger, 135 F. Supp. 2d 790 ( E.D. Mich. 2001).
9 Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 874 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
10 MICHAEL S. GREEN, FREEDOM, UNION AND POWER: LINCOLN AND HIS PARTY IN THE
CIVIL WAR (2004).
II See infra Appendix I.
12 Professors Elaine Shoben, Steve Johnson, & Thomas B. McAffee, William S. Boyd
School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
13 See, e.g., LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996); see also
JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CON-
STITUTION (1996).
14 See infra Appendix I.
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scholars go about trying to ascertain original intent is sometimes confusing or
perhaps limited.
First, legal scholars tend to focus very narrowly, particularly vis 6 vis the
Fourteenth Amendment. When I wrote my book on Reconstruction1 5 I tried to
talk about what they meant and what they were thinking of when they wrote the
Fourteenth Amendment and ratified it, but to do that you have to look at the
entire society. You've got to look at trends of ideology going back before the
Civil War. You've got to look at many historical actors outside of Congress
who had no direct role in the drafting and ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, but nonetheless created the climate of the time.
Professor Tanenhaus mentioned my book on Reconstruction. One of the
things that made it different from previous literature was that it made African-
Americans central actors in the Reconstruction Era. The former slaves helped
to set the agenda for that period and put forward their own vision of what
"emancipation" meant, and what kind of society should emerge out of the ashes
of slavery.' 6 There weren't any black people in Congress when the Fourteenth
Amendment was drafted. There were some African-Americans in the state leg-
islatures in the South that eventually ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, but
one interesting question might be, "How do you get an African-American voice
into discussions of the purpose or the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment?" You're not going to get that if you simply look at the members
of the Thirty-ninth Congress.' 7
So, as I say, historians' visions of this question are usually far broader and
far more indeterminate. I don't think any historian would say there was a sin-
gle meaning that was universally accepted in the Fourteenth Amendment.
There was a set of general purposes, but they came out of the greatest crisis in
our history. You have to step back and look at the whole battle over Recon-
struction that took place in 1865 and the first part of 1866. The Civil War had
thrown open to question fundamental issues about the nature of American soci-
ety. It had ended slavery. It had led to a significant decline in racism in the
North, although certainly not the elimination of racism. It had generated new
ideas which had very little precedent before the war about the American nation
and how to define what nationality is, about American citizenship, about the
federal system, about what freedom is in American society, and about the
Republican Party and its role in society. And all of those things flow into the
15 FONER, supra note 2.
16 For example, in the introduction to RECONSTRUCTION, Professor Foner noted the influ-
ence of the distinguished African American scholar and activist, W.E.B. DuBois. FONER,
supra note 2. See W.E.B. DuBois, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION: AN ESSAY TOWARD A His-
TORY OF THE PART WHICH BLACK FOLK PLAYED IN THE ATTEMPT TO RECONSTRUCT DEMOC-
RACY IN AMERICA, 1860-1880 (1935).
17 On African-American officeholders during Reconstruction, see ERIC FONER, FREEDOM'S
LAWMAKERS: A DIRECTORY OF BLACK OFFICEHOLDERS DURING RECONSTRUCTION (1993).
See also THOMAS C. HOLT, BLACK OVER WHITE: NEGRO POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN SOUTH
CAROLINA DURING RECONSTRUCTION (1977).
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Fourteenth Amendment. The original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment
covers all of these kinds of issues. 8
Now as I said in my Reconstruction book, and this was quoted in the book
by [Michael J.] Perry that's mentioned in the questions,' 9 the Thirty-ninth Con-
gress was engaged in a bitter battle with Andrew Johnson over the reconstruc-
tion of the nation. Without that battle, the Fourteenth Amendment might not
have been written. But in the course of that, Congress was forced to articulate
its vision of what the reconstructed nation ought to look like. My view is that
the Fourteenth Amendment was intentionally written in this broad, ambiguous
language that we all know. It's very different from the Civil Rights Law of
186620, which was passed over Johnson's veto in April 1866, so that's two
months before the Fourteenth Amendment is sent by Congress to the states.
The Civil Rights Law lists specific rights that you are to enjoy.2 ' The Four-
teenth Amendment doesn't list any specific rights. They didn't want to list
specific rights. Congressman Bingham, who was the key author, said, in effect,
we do not want to list rights because we might leave some out inadvertently.
We're not stating what the rights of citizens are. We are giving a principle of
how all citizens ought to enjoy equality in this country. They wanted to leave
the door open to future congresses, future courts, to deal with circumstances
that might not even be anticipated in 1866.
One of the key points about the Fourteenth Amendment which it's easy to
lose sight of is that the people who wrote it expected it to be enforced. You
don't put something in the Constitution and then expect it to be nullified for a
hundred years, which is what actually happened. And if it had been enforced,
then we wouldn't even be debating many of the questions today about what is
the federal court's power to override state legislation, et cetera. That's why
they put the third section in, which we don't even think about today, which
disqualifies from office leaders of the Confederacy. They wanted to create a
situation in which what they would consider loyal govemment would come into
power in the South. Johnson's governments would be eliminated and you
would have local governments which were willing to abide by this principle of
equality among citizens. In that case, the federal government wouldn't have to
do anything. But it didn't work out that way. They didn't anticipate it
wouldn't work out that way. They didn't dismantle the federal system but they
assumed, as I said, that local and state governments of the South within the
federal system would abide by the Constitution. That didn't happen, and there-
fore the way the Fourteenth Amendment evolved eventually was based on the
fact that local governments were obstructing it and nullifying it, not abiding by
it.
8 FONER, supra note 2; see also LAWANDA COX & JOHN H. Cox, POLITICS, PRINCIPLE, AND
PREJUDICE, 1865-1866: DILEMMA OF RECONSTRUCTION AMERICA (1963); and ERIC L.
McKITRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION (1960).
19 MICHAEL J. PERRY, WE THE PEOPLE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE SUPREME
COURT 48 (1999). See also Eric Foner, My Life as an Historian, in HISTORIANS AND RACE
91 (Paul A. Cimbala & Robert F. Himmelberg eds., 1996).
20 1866 Civil Rights Act, 14 Stat.27 (1866).
21 Id.
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Now again, to think about the Fourteenth Amendment, we have to step
back and think about the abolition of slavery. I mean that's the fundamental
point here, the abolition of slavery. What are the consequences for American
society of the abolition of slavery? You can't answer that question without first
asking, what is slavery, to begin with? What do you think slavery is? That
may seem like a very simple question, but it's not. What was abolished? Was
it labor without wages? Is that what was abolished, so now people have to pay
wages and that is the meaning of emancipation? Is slavery a broad system of
racial inequality? And if that's abolished, other consequences flow out of
emancipation. Is it a system of unequal power in which some people exercise
power over others in the society? Is that what's abolished? What is necessary
to secure the abolition of that? What does it mean to be a free American?
Remember, Congress passed the Civil Rights Law of 1866 under the Thirteenth
Amendment, not the Fourteenth; there was no Fourteenth Amendment. The
Civil Rights Law was passed as part of the abolition of slavery. That was the
constitutional justification for it. It was part of the implementation of the aboli-
tion of slavery to create a situation of legal equality and of black citizenship.
So this question of what is slavery is really at the heart of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Another way of putting it is to say, "What further social changes
are needed in a society that was resting on slavery to fulfill the promise of the
abolition of slavery?" Slavery was absolutely central to American life, politics,
constitutionalism, economics before the Civil War. The abolition of that insti-
tution, as I said, raised all sorts of questions about what new systems, what new
institutions, what new principles had to be implemented. That's the kind of
question that the Thirty-ninth Congress was thinking about. There was no one
single answer. You will search in vain for a single set of answers to that ques-
tion that all members of Congress agreed to.
Second of all, the Fourteenth Amendment was a political document. It
was written in part to be the platform for the Republican Party in the congres-
sional elections of 1866. It was a compromise between the various factions of
the Republican Party. There were Radical Republicans who wanted to give
African-American men the right to vote. As you all know, the Fourteenth
Amendment does not give anybody the right to vote. It attempts to penalize
states which deny certain men the right to vote, but it was denounced by quite a
few Radicals for recognizing the right of states to limit the fight to vote. On the
other hand, there were people like Thaddeus Stevens, a congressman, not a
senator. Read Stevens's speech, the last speech before the adoption by the
House of the Fourteenth Amendment. It was a wonderful speech where he laid
out the Radical vision of a perfect republic with no inequality of race, of caste,
et cetera. Then he said, in essence, that dream has vanished. That's not what
the Fourteenth Amendment is. It's imperfect. But I am supporting it. Why?
Because it's a step in the right direction. We're going to continue to move
forward.2 2 In other words, people like Stevens didn't think the Fourteenth
Amendment was the final statement of the victorious Union as to what the
status of the former slaves was going to be. This was a resting place. Most
22 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3144, 3148-49, 4103 (discussed in FONER, supra,
note 2, at 254).
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northern Republicans didn't think you could go to the northern public in 1866
with black suffrage as part of your platform, so they put that issue aside until
after the election.
And so one of the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment was to secure
the supremacy of the Republican Party in the nation. That's why I think Bush
v. Gore,2 3 which is one of the oddest uses of the Fourteenth Amendment, actu-
ally was a good original intent decision, because the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to keep the Republican Party in power and that's how the
Supreme Court acted.
Remember also that the shadow of Dred Scott 24 hovered over all of these
deliberations. Dred Scott was by far the most important decision of the
Supreme Court before the Civil War in the minds of the people who fought the
Civil War. It was a warning against the Supreme Court usurping power. The
service of black soldiers in the Civil War and the general process of emancipa-
tion had repudiated Dred Scott and had, as I said, led to a different vision of
American life in which African-Americans were citizens of the United States,
which Dred Scott denied. But there was also a long tradition of what you
might call alternative constitutionalism which had no legal standing before the
Civil War but had been articulated by abolitionists and some Radical Republi-
cans. This other tradition of a unified nation-state with a single national citi-
zenship with all citizens enjoying the same rights, that vision had been
legitimated, so to speak, by the Civil War and emancipation, and that's part of
what a lot of members of Congress thought they were doing in drafting the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Now I would be happy to discuss, if people want, the whole logic or
illogic of originalism, original intent, as a mode of constitutional interpretation.
As a historian, I notice that textual originalism is something that all sorts of
people appeal to when it's in their self-interest to do so, and when it's not, they
forget about it. Today it's mostly appealed to by conservatives. During the
Clinton impeachment, it was suddenly liberals who were racing back to dis-
cover the original intent of the drafters of the Constitution as to what that provi-
sion about impeachment, high crimes, and misdemeanors meant, and they said,
no, no, the Founding Fathers would never have meant the kind of things that
Clinton was accused of, so they suddenly became originalists. In fact, during
the Clinton impeachment, a group of historians circulated a public statement
that the impeachment of Clinton was a violation of the original purpose of the
impeachment clause in the Constitution. I refused to sign it. I thought the
impeachment of Clinton was absurd, but I refused to sign it and people said,
what, are you in favor of the impeachment of Clinton? I said no, I am not in
favor, but I am against this whole idea that originalism is how you decide
whether the guy should be impeached or not, and moreover I notice that most
of the people who signed this are not constitutional scholars. To the person
who asked me to sign it, I said, "Can you tell me what the original meaning of
those words was in the minds of the Philadelphia convention?" And she said,
"Well, no." I said, "Well, how can I sign this then? How can you sign it?"
23 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
24 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
[Vol. 6:425
Winter 2005/2006] A CONVERSATION WITH ERIC FONER
"Well, because we're against the impeachment of Clinton." [Laughter] The
attempt to use history to answer political questions can often lead you to be
skating on very thin ice, so to speak.
But I also find it odd that some conservatives have been trying to, for
example, square the Brown25 decision with original intent, and if there's one
thing you can say about the Thirty-ninth Congress, it was not thinking about
school segregation when it passed the Fourteenth Amendment. There's no
question about that. They set up a segregated school system in Washington,
D.C. right at the same time. Most black leaders were not thinking about it. The
issue of segregation versus integration was not an issue at that time. It's like
saying what were they thinking about gay marriage? It was not an issue, so
they weren't. There's nothing about gay marriage in the original intent. The
issue at the time was access to education, and whether African-Americans
should have education. Under slavery it was illegal to educate a slave. In
presidential reconstruction, some of the southern states began making provision
for public education but only for whites. So in a sense, the Thirty-ninth Con-
gress said no, blacks have to get education too. It is illegal to set up a school
system just for whites. That was the issue: exclusion from education, not inte-
gration or segregation.
The funny thing is Brown is now iconic. I mean, even Robert Bork says
that Brown was rightly decided on an originalist ground, which is ridiculous.
The Supreme Court itself, as you know, was quite candid about that in its deci-
sion. It said, we really don't know what the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment was, and anyway, it doesn't matter. Education means something
entirely different in mid-twentieth century America than it did in mid-nine-
teenth century America. So the deprivation of the right to equal education is a
wholly different matter.
By the way, as a student of mine pointed out to me this week when I
mentioned I was coming out here to talk about this, "Look, even on the website
of the Supreme Court, there is a little history of the Supreme Court and in there
it talks about the Supreme Court guaranteeing rights under a living constitu-
tion."2 6 The website of the Supreme Court itself repudiates original intent and
talks about a living constitution.
Let me just say one or two more things about this because I think more
important to this topic is how the courts do try to use history, and often misuse
it. When the Supreme Court does refer in footnotes of opinions to Reconstruc-
tion, they normally cite literature which is completely out of date. In other
words, if you're going to be an originalist, you ought to be up to date in histori-
cal interpretation, but they aren't. But the courts have an obligation to know
up-to-date history, which they often don't, and particularly when it comes to
issues of race. I may be wrong about this but I believe it's true that no Supreme
Court decision has ever stated that America is a racist society. In fact, they
denigrate what are called by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor arguments based on
"societal racism."27 You can have a remedy if there's individual discrimina-
25 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
26 See http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/constitutional.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2006).
27 See FONER, WHO OWNS HISTORY?: RETHINKING THE PAST IN A CHANGING WORLD 184-
85 (2002).
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tion. In fact, in a famous Richmond affirmative action case,2 8 the Supreme
Court overturned a Richmond city plan to give extra benefits to black construc-
tion companies. O'Connor's opinion said you know the fact that they didn't
give contracts in the past to a lot of black contractors, none of them, doesn't
prove discrimination. Maybe blacks just choose different occupations than
whites. 29 Now, to say that in this country, as if the choice of occupation in
American history has been totally free for everybody and equal and the distri-
bution of people along the employment system is just a matter of individual
choice, shows a shocking lack of understanding of the history of race in this
country. But you find that all the time, and I can well understand why the
Supreme Court doesn't want to rule "this is a racist society" because look at all
the cases that would open up with people seeking remedies. Still, I found it
interesting because on affirmative action, for example, the court rulings are
absurd to any person who knows any history. Everybody knows the reason for
affirmative action is because some people have had the country standing on
their neck for three hundred years, and finally they took their foot off their neck
and said, well, maybe we'll give you a little help. To most people that makes
sense, but that is not the legal basis for affirmative action. As you all know, the
legal basis is the educational value of diversity.
I was the witness in a court in Detroit, a federal court.30 I wrote an expert
opinion and I went and testified, which was a very interesting experience which
drove home to me the difference between a legal situation and a historical situ-
ation. First of all, the judge seemed to think this was an opportunity to get a
free education and he kept questioning me over and over about Reconstruction.
He said, "Professor, what was Andrew Johnson doing?" And what about this
and what about that and the Klan? It didn't have anything to do with the case
but he just figured he had a free opportunity to clear up a few things in Ameri-
can history. It was like being back in my orals exams.
Then the cross-examination began and they started asking me questions
about my expert opinion. But of course the difference is that to a historian,
especially when you're dealing with an issue like race, you're generally looking
for nuance and complication. You're always looking to give the full complex
picture with all the different variables. That's not what they want in a court of
law. They want yes-and-no answers, but these questions are not amenable to
yes-and-no answers, so I found it very interesting.
But even more profoundly, to go back to my other point, I wrote this
expert opinion, and it was a history of race in America, but it had to support
this legal argument. I didn't write anything that I didn't believe was true. I
wrote about how the historical experience of African-Americans and whites has
been so different in American history that most blacks and most whites have
ended up with very different perceptions-which I think is true-about key
issues like the police, the legal system, is this a free society, things like that.
That fits into the diversity argument. But if I were just sitting down to write a
history of race, I wouldn't write about that. That's not how I would start off. I
would talk about a lot of other issues which are much more important than
28 City of Richmond v. J. A. Cronson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
29 Id. at 510.
30 Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 874 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
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whether psychologically blacks and whites have different perceptions. The
Supreme Court's unwillingness to face up to the real history of racism in
America skews the whole debate into this strange diversity area which to me is
a minor little side note to the actual reasons for affirmative action.
Let me finish by saying that lawyers should do their job and historians
should do their job. The questions historians ask are not always the same ques-
tions that lawyers or legal professionals ask. It was a British historian, W.R.
Brock, who made what may be the most profound point of all here, in a book
called An American Crisis.3 1 It took a British historian, where they don't have
a written constitution, to say, actually the existence of a written Constitution
was a big problem during the Reconstruction era, that this notion of constitu-
tionalism actually was an impediment to solving the crisis of a nation in a
situation that the Founding Fathers had never anticipated. You can go to the
Constitution all you want and you will never find out what the Constitution
says about reconstructing the nation after a civil war. There's nothing in there.
But the need to do so shows the power of constitutionalism even in the victori-
ous North. You know Stevens said, let's treat them as conquered provinces;
forget about the Constitution. That had the virtue of being true. I mean that
was the reality. The South was a conquered territory. That's the only reason
they were in the Union. But most Northerners were not willing to go to that
step. They wanted a set of policies that they could claim were within a consti-
tutional framework, and if they couldn't do that they would amend the Consti-
tution. But they were thinking within this constitutionalism mode of thought,
and Brock said that really was a straitjacket on thought. It stifled creativity at
the moment of the greatest crisis in American history. So, that's another thing
we might want to think about, whether our focus on the Constitution might be a
little misguided when so many other issues were up for grabs at that time which
were not in their essence constitutional issues.
Let me just stop there and throw the discussion open to any questions or
comments or anything anyone may want to put on the table here.
Jean Sternlight:3 2 I'm Jean Sternlight. I'm a law professor. This is a
rather broad question, so feel free to narrow it as you need to. I'm wondering
whether as a historian you can give us a sense of why you think the United
States has ended up or the United States Supreme Court has ended up with this
very cramped version of how race ought to be viewed. Specifically, why does
our country or the Supreme Court insist on the colorblind sort of methodology,
whereas in quite a few other countries they've been able to deal with their racist
history in a more up-front way and take more of the approach that you've
suggested when they undertake affirmative action or whatever it might be
called in other places to make up for past wrongs.
Eric Foner: I think that's a great question, and I don't actually have any
very profound answer to it. I think in some sense it is a reflection of the very
strong hold that some idea of meritocracy and individual striving still holds in
this country, that people ought to advance on their own merits, and that some-
31 W.R. BROCK, AN AMERICAN CRISIS: CONGRESS AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1867
(1966).
32 Jean Stemlight, Director of the Saltman Center for Conflict Resolution, Saltman Profes-
sor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
thing that holds somebody back is illegitimate. Obviously slavery is illegiti-
mate. Discrimination is illegitimate. But this is a society of individuals. The
thinking is out there that especially since the civil rights movement and since
the writing of civil rights laws, racism is a thing of the past. I'm sure people
say, yeah, maybe back in the 1920s and '30s there was widespread racism but
we're not in a position to deal with that now. Today we have a society in
which people have equal opportunity. If you can find specific examples of
people being denied that, then fine, we'll adjudicate it. There's one group on
the Court, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas, who say that the basic prob-
lem is classification by race.33 Even thinking about race is the problem. In a
really colorblind society, race would be off limits. Nobody would talk about it
and it would be gone. That is not the position of the whole Supreme Court but
I think the O'Connor position, which was basically the centrist position on the
Supreme Court, was what I said, that basically racism is not a big problem right
now, and therefore the Supreme Court cannot deal with it; that societal racism
is too abstract an issue to be able to be dealt with through legal means.
Is affirmative action a violation of the principle of equal protection of the
laws that is in the Fourteenth Amendment? Again, a historian can't answer that
question without asking, "What is the basis on which you want to interpret the
Constitution?" Did the people who wrote it envision affirmative action? Well,
not in a modem sense, but they had just set up the Freedmen's Bureau as a
federal agency to help out the former slaves. Is that affirmative action? Maybe
it is, in a modem sense. I don't know. But I think they would've been very
surprised at the notion-which is quite popular on the court today-that actions
of government that seek to help a previously degraded group are legally
equivalent to actions that favor an advantaged group. I think they wouldn't
have accepted that logic at all. But it all depends on what you mean by
equality.
As you all know, the Fourteenth Amendment introduced the notion of
equality into the Constitution. There was nothing about equality in the original
Constitution except when it talks about the number of senators that each state
has. That's the only use of the word "equal" in the original Constitution. The
Fourteenth Amendment introduces the notion of equality. Until you can define
for yourself what you mean by equality, you can't answer a lot of these ques-
tions about what is the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Martin Geer:3 4 This whole notion of original intent, how did that
develop in constitutional jurisprudence?
Eric Foner: Well, there are probably a lot of people in this room who are
more qualified to answer that question than I am. It's like the weather, right?
Everyone talks about it but nobody does anything about it. The Supreme Court
generally does not operate on original intent. There are dozens and dozens of
Supreme Court rulings which are considered good law today which are com-
pletely opposite to any notion of original intent. Do you think the Founding
Fathers thought that flag burning was a violation of the freedom of speech? I
" See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); see also FONER,
supra note 27, at 186.
14 Martin Geer, Externship Director and Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law,
University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
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don't think they did. But I don't know. Does the Supreme Court operate on
the basis of original intent today, a majority of the Supreme Court?
David S.Tanenhaus: In response to Marty Geer's question, do you read
the Dred Scott decision as the beginning of original intent?
Eric Foner: Well, Dred Scott was an original intent decision, although a
lot of historians think that Chief Justice Roger Taney overdid it in terms of the
most infamous line, that a black person has no rights which a white man is
bound to respect.35 That was Taney saying that's what the Founding Fathers
believed. In fact, he said we're actually a little more enlightened than the
Founding Fathers, but the job of the Supreme Court is to do what the Founding
Fathers intended. This was the first original intent decision maybe, if you want
to put it that way. But many people would say that's completely wrong. That's
not what the Founding Fathers or the revolutionary generation thought. Black
people voted in some states to elect delegates to the ratifying conventions that
ratified the Constitution. How can you say that they had no rights which any-
one was bound to respect? In fact, at the time of the ratification of the Consti-
tution, more states allowed African-Americans to vote than didn't, if they met
property qualifications. So one thing about original intent, as I said before, is
that you have to be up to date with history; and also it's a very strange doctrine
if you really take it seriously. Constitutional jurisprudence could be turned
around 180 degrees if we happen to find more historical evidence. We find a
box of papers, letters by delegates to the Constitutional Convention, talking
about, I don't know-well, let's say we find out that James Madison was gay.
That might completely upend all of our constitutional theory in some way. So
that's a strange basis for deciding what principles are to be implemented in
2005.
What about this question of, "Is the Supreme Court at the moment in its
majority operating on the basis of original intent? Yes or no?" This is a court.
[Laughter]
David S. Tanenhaus: I think just my own response to that, I think there
are certain members of the Court, particularly Justice Thomas, who see case
law as something that doesn't have the legitimacy of trying to determine origi-
nal intent or the Founders-
Eric Foner: Right.
David S. Tanenhaus: And I think there's a sense that we don't think
about constitutional law as kind of the development of common law with false
digressions-
Eric Foner: Right. Right.
David S. Tanenhaus: We don't appreciate advances in history. So I
don't think the majority of the Court is operating on the basis of original intent.
Eric Foner: Well, it clearly doesn't. Look at Lawrence v. Texas.3 6 Jus-
tice Kennedy's 5-4 opinion said explicitly that freedom is a concept that
changes over time.37 He completely repudiated the original intent notion. He
said freedom means something different today. Today it is inadmissible to
15 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857) (discussed in FONER, supra note 27, at 177).
36 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
37 Id. at 564-74 (providing a broad historical summary of changes in jurisprudence regard-
ing sodomy both in the United States and abroad).
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penalize people because of private consensual behavior. It may have been per-
missible in the past, but what does that have to do with today? That's idiotic.
If the Founding Fathers thought that gays should be penalized, why should that
mean that in 2005 we should do that? So I don't actually think the Supreme
Court operates on original intent-maybe in individual cases they do, but not
generally speaking.
Sylvia Lazos:38 I wanted to go back to Professor Sternlight's question
about why American constitutional law has had such a difficult time with
racism. Let me suggest one answer and that is the direction of law in the
United States has been dominated by white men. First it took two hundred
years to get Thurgood Marshall appointed to the Court, and if you read
Thurgood Marshall's opinions, they're very different from those of Justice
O'Connor and Justice Scalia.
Eric Foner: Right. Right.
Sylvia Lazos: That's why we have this version of white America's view
of history, which is white people are innocent and we're a great country; and if
anybody tries hard enough he can make it just like a white person can.
Eric Foner: I think that there's a lot of truth in that, and in fact Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsberg is another example one could cite because of her concur-
ring opinion in Grutter.39 She didn't base it on diversity. She based it on the
history of racism. She said up front, look, there's been a lot of racism in this
country and that's why we need some affirmative action, and there's still
racism. But that was not the majority opinion of the Court.
The point you're raising is very good and really in a sense goes to the
heart of a fundamental problem with original intent, which is how do you get
the voices of the excluded into an original intent debate? The fifty-five men
who drafted the original Constitution represented a very narrow segment of
American society. They were rich, they were white, they were free, and they
were male. Not only that, they had their own private self-interests which they
wrote into the Constitution. I don't want to go back to Charles Beard but they
did have a vested interest in the credit of the country being stable. Why should
we privilege the views of a small minority of the population over many others
who at the time held different views but weren't represented because of the
structure of power in the Constitutional Convention?
So you're right-just the makeup of the Court, the makeup of the legal
system, and the makeup of Congress have tended to move the law in a direction
which is not all that open to clear judgments about the enduring history. I
personally am sympathetic to the idea, although no court in the land has ever
adopted this, that the Thirteenth Amendment ought to be used in these cases,
not the Fourteenth Amendment. We might be better off without the Fourteenth
Amendment at all.
Many of these disputed policies are consequences of the abolition of slav-
ery-are logical consequences-it goes back to my point of what is the aboli-
tion of slavery? If it's the destruction of an entire social order based on
inequality, then efforts to raise people to equality is a logical consequence of
38 Sylvia Lazos, Justice Myron Leavitt Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law,
University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
" Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 345-346 (2003).
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the Amendment. Now someone might say, well, look, how are you going to
get women into that, though? Affirmative action applies to women. That's a
good question. But in terms of African-Americans-I think the only case-I
could be wrong about this-that cited the Thirteenth Amendment was, I think it
was '68, this open-housing case, Jones.4" They used the phrase "the badges of
servitude" or something4' to support a federal open-housing law.
David B. Thronson:4 2 In thinking about who the Fourteenth Amendment
reaches, I teach immigration law and we see a resurgence of people trying to
argue back to an original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment as affecting only
African-Americans, so that the rights of citizenship in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to all persons born in the United States isn't intended in any way to reach
anyone other than African-American slaves who were freed.
Eric Foner: I don't think that's true. I mean again they were not debating
immigration at that time, but they were well aware that these measures, put in
abstract terms, would affect many. In my book, I seem to remember I actually
quoted a congressman who said this affects immigrants from abroad, it affects
everybody. But we know they were thinking of other groups because when
they passed the Fifteenth Amendment, they specifically reworded it, unfortu-
nately, to allow western states, I have to say, to exclude the Chinese from vot-
ing. Because you know the original language of the Fifteenth Amendment was
a positive grant of the right to vote to males over the age of twenty-one, which
would've eliminated a lot of the methods that southern states eventually used to
disenfranchise blacks. But California, Nevada, Oregon said, no, no, no, we
can't let these Chinese vote, so they turned it around and said you can't deprive
a person of the right to vote on the basis of race but you can on other grounds.
So they realized that these principles were going to be applying to other people
than former slaves.
Willard H. Rollings:4 3 Native Americans were not citizens until 1924.
Eric Foner: Right . .. it says in the Fourteenth Amendment, of course,
except Indians not taxed. You may know better than I-I've often asked this
and I've never known. Is that true of Indians not on reservations also?
Willard H. Rollings: Yes, it applies to Indians that-there were Indians
who left the reservation and said, OK, I'm living in Omaha, I'm living like a
white person...
Eric Foner: And they're still not citizens. Oh, that's interesting. OK, I
didn't even realize that.
David B. Thronson: They're citizens but by statute, not by Constitution.
Eric Foner: Well, in '24, they did give Indians American citizenship,
right?
40 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441 n.78 (1968) (citing Justice Harlan's
dissent in Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
41 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 43 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[Sluch discrimination
practiced by corporations and individuals in the exercise of their public or quasi-public func-
tions is a badge of servitude, the imposition of which Congress may prevent under its power.
By appropriate legislation, to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment .... ").
42 David B. Thronson, Associate Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, Uni-
versity of Nevada, Las Vegas.
13 Willard B. Rollings, Associate Professor of History, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
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Willard H. Rollings: In '24 they gave them citizenship. They didn't vote
in Arizona until...
Eric Foner: Right. Voting. But voting of course is not a right of citizen-
ship in our law, as we all know, and that goes back to this question of what we
mean by equality. In the mid-nineteenth century, people who talked about this
made distinctions among different kinds of equality which are much less famil-
iar today. There were natural rights which were open to everyone. That's what
Abraham Lincoln said, you know. Before the Civil War, he said, essentially, a
black person may not be his equal in intelligence, in looks. He didn't favor
them voting. He didn't favor them holding office. But he pointed out that in
the rights of the Declaration of Independence, the natural rights of man, they
are his equal and everyone else's.44 So that's one definition of equality.
Equality of natural rights. That's why slavery is wrong, says Lincoln, because
of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Liberty is a natural right of all
mankind.
Then there's civil rights, you know, the right to go to court, testify, the
right to own property, et cetera, et cetera. Well, the Civil Rights Law of 1866
said everyone's got to have that.
Then there's political rights, which obviously states can regulate and
nobody thought that it was a violation-well, no male thought it was a viola-
tion-to deprive women of the right to vote; that didn't take away their
equality.
And then there was this very amorphous area called social rights or social
equality. Nobody who was talking about the Fourteenth Amendment except
Charles Sumner believed in social equality. Social equality tended to mean
intermarriage between black and white. I mean that's another good original
question: Was Loving4 5 decided on original intent grounds? The people who
were writing the Fourteenth Amendment weren't thinking about interracial
marriage. Social equality was for individuals; the state could not mandate.
And that got to things like access to public accommodations. But then only
nine years after this, they passed the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which did legis-
late social equality in many areas. Then the Supreme Court declared that
unconstitutional.46 But this was a period when ideas were changing very
dynamically, when concepts of equality were growing. What someone thought
in 1865 was different than they thought in 1869, in 1871. So to freeze us at the
Fourteenth Amendment, just taking that language, doesn't give a picture of an
era of very rapid change. So should we take their views of equality, that there
' First Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Ottawa, Illinois, August 21, 1858. Mr. Lincoln
said, specifically:
[T]here is no reason in the world why the negro is not entitled to all the natural rights enumerated
in the Declaration of Independence-the right of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. I
hold that he is as much entitled to these as the white man. I agree with Judge Douglas he is not
my equal in many respects-certainly not in color, perhaps not in moral or intellectual endow-
ment. But in the right to eat the bread, without the leave of anybody else, which his own hand
earns, he is my equal and the equal of Judge Douglas, and the equal of every living man.
Available at http://www.bartleby.com/268/9/23.html.
4" Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
46 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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are these sharp distinctions between these various areas? In our modem uses,
they all get jumbled up together all the time.
Joseph A. Fry:4 7 Do you think that these amendments could have been
passed at any other moment in American history?
Eric Foner: No, they couldn't. And there are those who claim that the
Fourteenth Amendment was not actually legally adopted because it was
required-this is Brock's point.4" The constitutional system led to some very
strange things. The South was unrepresented in Congress and yet it was
counted among the states of which three-quarters had to ratify an amendment.
The North didn't just say, "three-fourths of the North's going to ratify this
amendment because the South's out of the Union." They didn't say that. At
first, the southern states rejected the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866. That's
one of the reasons they moved to Radical Reconstruction. The Reconstruction
Acts required new legislatures in the South to be convened which would ratify
the Fourteenth Amendment. And if they didn't, they couldn't get their repre-
sentation in Congress back. So some people say, well, this was never really
legally ratified because what gives Congress the right to require a state to ratify
it? Good question. I guess Bruce Ackerman says that in his book, We the
People.4 9 He says it was a kind of revolutionary moment. But if you're going
to go on that route, what gave the fifty-five men the right to rewrite the Consti-
tution at all in the first place? They were supposed to be meeting about amend-
ing the Articles of Confederation. Nobody gave them the right to write a new
Constitution, but they did it.
Thomas B. McAffee:5 0 I always thought the answer was the North won
the Civil War.
Eric Foner: And that's a critical point. But also remember, Andrew
Johnson required the southern states to ratify the Thirteenth Amendment to get
recognized governments, so there is this precedent. But as I say, the need to
follow constitutional forms created a very odd set of circumstances.
Joseph A. Fry: If this were not to have happened, you have a far more
pessimistic sort of possible era of American history subsequent to-
Eric Foner: No, not necessarily. This goes back to when I went to the
University of Virginia Law School. My book, The Story of American Free-
dom, had just come out, and Michael Klarman, who has his own particular
view about the role of the Supreme Court, said that very lawyer and law profes-
sor should read Professor Foner's book because there aren't any Supreme Court
decisions in it. In other words, the history of the United States is not just a
series of Supreme Court decisions. So we would've still had the civil rights
movement if there wasn't a Fourteenth Amendment, you know what I mean?
And some other grounds would've been found for eliminating segregation. I
think it is a melancholy reflection that probably that is the only moment, maybe
even up to the present day, when the Fourteenth Amendment could have been
ratified. It was a very unusual moment in American history.
47 Joseph A. Fry, Distinguished Professor of History, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
48 See BROCK, supra note 31.
49 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991).
'0 Thomas McAffee, Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of
Nevada, Las Vegas.
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I don't really believe in counterfactual history. What would the history of
the United States look like without the Fourteenth Amendment? You still
would've had social movements of people claiming their rights. People
would've still demanded equality. They would've done it in different ways,
different forums, different legal language. I'm not a total Klarmanite but I do
think he's right, that a lot of what we think of as constitutional change comes
out of other realms of the society and then is recognized by the courts. You can
see how that has happened in other areas which really aren't that relevant -o the
Fourteenth Amendment, like privacy rights. The Court has still found a way to
accommodate to social change even when it's not explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution.
Annette Appell:5 I'm Annette Appell. I teach at the law school. I
appreciate your comments very much about original intent, but I did want to go
back in history, not to original intent, but to what you refer to as the "climate of
the times." I'm particularly interested in my research about children and fami-
lies, and parental and children's rights. What can you say about what the "cli-
mate of the times" was regarding the effect of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments on the formation of families and the privacy of families at that
time in American history?
Eric Foner: Well, that's a great question. You know there is a little liter-
ature on this by Lea VanderVelde.5 2 That's a very interesting question because
one of the key critiques of slavery by the abolitionist movement was that it
destroyed family life.
Annette Appell: Peggy Cooper Davis has written about the importance of
family rights using abolitionist narratives.53
Eric Foner: Right. I mean this was one of the main arguments. It
destroyed family life, it subjected black women to sexual exploitation, it dis-
placed the man from his natural role as the head of the family, and it was
widely believed that one of the consequences of emancipation was that now
African-Americans would have the right to form families just like everyone
else's families, but those were families which would be male-headed. And in
fact the law at that time, even though there were some changes going on, the
common law of coverture was still around, and legally-speaking the man was
the head of the family and property rights were vested in the man. The Freed-
men's Bureau made men sign contracts for their families. I don't know why
this is, but I think the Southern Homestead Act actually said "any person." I
think it opened even to women to getting public land in the South.
But the basic point is one of the consequences of the end of slavery was
widely believed to be that African-American families would now enjoy the
same inviolability as white families had. I don't know if you want to call that
11 Annette Appell, Associate Dean for Clinical Studies, William S. Boyd Professor of Law,
William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
52 Lea VanderVelde is the Josephine R. Witte Professor of Law at the University of Iowa.
She has written, for example, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 437 (1989).
" PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES
(1997).
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privacy. The notion of privacy in any modem sense didn't really exist at that
time, I don't think.
This was a problem for the women's rights movement at the time because
there were people like Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony and
others who said the liberation of women ought to come out of this. For exam-
ple, does the Thirteenth Amendment apply to labor within the household?
Should not women receive wages for work done in the home now that the
Thirteenth Amendment has abolished involuntary servitude? But congressmen
explicitly said no, this does not apply within the household, that women's work
within the household is not included in the kind of work that the Thirteenth
Amendment had in mind.
So it's a very complex question. There were women at the time who tried
to seize on the language of the Fourteenth Amendment to make what at the
time were very radical claims for the right of divorce, for the right of women to
control their wages. By this time most states had married women's property
acts, but very few states allowed a married woman to control her own wages if
she worked. They still legally belonged to the husband. These claims didn't
get very far, but that doesn't mean they didn't have legitimacy if one takes a
broad view of what equality might mean.
Annette Appell: The thing that I'm particularly interested in is the par-
ent-child dyad and triad not the husband-wife dyad.
Eric Foner: Well, again, you see, the shadow of slavery hangs over this
whole debate, and under slavery parents did not control their children. For
example, whether a child went to work or not was controlled by the owner, not
the parents. And one of the main demands of African-Americans was exactly
the right to control over their own children. You see this in those states in
which the Black Codes that were passed in 1865, '66. North Carolina was the
most notorious, including apprenticeship provisions allowing courts to basi-
cally take any black child and apprentice him out or her out to a white
employer. And these were not apprenticeships like in Benjamin Franklin's
time where you learned a craft. The owner had no responsibility whatsoever; it
was just another form of slavery. And there are bitter, bitter court battles in
North Carolina until eventually the Freedmen's Bureau just abrogates that law
about control of children. Courts are taking children away from black families
and giving them over to white families as under slavery. So the family unit, the
inviolability of the family unit was a critical thing in the minds of people think-
ing about the consequences of the abolition of slavery. But I don't know. You
know more than I. I don't think the notion of the rights of children had any real
legal standing in 1866. Maybe I'm wrong.
Annette Appell: Oh, no, you're right; they didn't, not at that time.
Notions of children's rights are more recent.
Eric Foner: So again it's hard to think how that would apply 140 years
later.
Gregory Borchard:54 Greg Borchard. I'm in the School of Journalism.
I appreciate your reluctance to overemphasize the role of the Supreme Court in
14 Gregory Borchard, Assistant Professor, Hank Greenspun School of Journalism and Media
Studies, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
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history. I can't help wondering how Plessy v. Ferguson55 fits in to all of this,
especially given the idea of original intent. Was this an attempt to do the oppo-
site of that if it was a direct reflection on the Fourteenth Amendment?
Eric Foner: Well, no. Plessy, of course, is a great case in this regard.
The Supreme Court began interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment very quickly
in ways that a lot of members of Congress saw as a big mistake. In Slaughter
House56 which is 1873, it was just a few years later, many people who had
helped to draft the Fourteenth Amendment thought the Supreme Court was
completely wrong in limiting the scope of the rights granted in the Fourteenth
Amendment very dramatically. And again, Plessy is a great case because it all
depends on what you think the Civil War was all about. I mean that's what
Justice John Marshall Harlan said. We remember Harlan's dissent, where he
says the Constitution is colorblind,5 7 but that's not the important part of his
dissent. He says in that dissent, this is a case about freedom. It's not a case
about equal protection.5 8 It's a case about freedom. These people were slaves.
Part of the abolition of slavery is that they must be treated in the public sphere
as equal to everybody else, and singling them out for special treatment is a
violation of emancipation, he said, not the Fourteenth Amendment. This is an
attempt to continue the legacy of slavery in this country. So Harlan put it right
out there. He said forget about this question of whites can't go in the black car
and blacks can't go in the white car, so they're being treated equally. That's
ridiculous. Everyone knows that's not the purpose of this law, to treat every-
one equally. It's to degrade a group of people, and that is a consequence of
slavery. So if we're serious about the emancipation of the slaves, we can't
have laws like this. Is that an original intent decision? No. That's a decision
about what the nature of American society is. I mean that's not a decision; that
was one vote.
Thomas B. McAffee: That's one thing that's tricky, I think, about the
whole problem of originalism and original intent. For example, I recently read
a book by somebody who was very, very critical of originalists who try to
claim that Brown was a correct originalist decision on the one hand. On the
other hand he said that a decision clearly based on a doctrine of white
supremacy would be inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment. But Plessy
seems to be exactly that.
Eric Foner: Well, yes, that's what it was. Of course Brown obviously
repudiated that. If you think the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to abolish
white supremacy and that's the original intent, then that is fine, but that cer-
tainly opens the door to a lot of other things that have not yet been adjudicated.
By the way, just to throw another monkey wrench into the whole thing, no one
has mentioned what to my mind is one of the odder Supreme Court traditions if
one believes in original intent, and that is the use of the Fourteenth Amendment
to define a corporation as entitled to the protection of persons. There is not a
scintilla of evidence that anybody in 1866 intended the Fourteenth Amendment
to go in that direction, but nonetheless that's, as you all know-well, that's still
55 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
56 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36 (1873).
57 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559.
58 Id.
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the law, isn't it? So surely we should expect Scalia and Thomas to declare that
corporations are not persons and do not have the right to due process and can
be regulated by the state any way we feel, right? Isn't that likely to happen?
Sylvia Lazos: Well, let me try to sum up what I understand you to be
saying, Professor Foner. It seems to me that you are probably a living constitu-
tionalist, and it seems to me that you arrive at that conclusion because you see
history as dynamic, moving, that the political process is one in which we form
ideas, the basic principles of democratic society. In your more recent book,
you talk about liberty as being kind of the key idea around which American
society, be that courts, the people, Congress, interest groups, whatever have
been debating and that that idea has been kind of the key idea that has shaped
our democracy and should be shaping our constitutional precedents.
Eric Foner: I will accept all of that but I will add as well that a lot of
people got into the habit during the heyday of the Warren Court of thinking the
courts are going to solve all our problems, and I think we need to get out of that
habit of thinking. One of the basic premises of my book on freedom is that the
idea of freedom has changed many, many times in American history; it's been
the subject of contestation many times, but that the dynamic force in these
changes is social movements of people demanding greater rights or new defini-
tions of rights. It used to be that when people had grievances, they took to the
streets. Now if they have a grievance, they hire a lawyer, and I think that's not
necessarily a healthy development in any democracy.
David S. Tanenhaus: I want to thank Professor Foner and also let you
know that he'll be delivering a University Forum lecture this evening, The
Meaning of Freedom in American History, where he'll talk about some of the
themes that came up today, as well as thinking a little bit also about how 9/11
has shaped the national conversation we've been having. I want to thank all of
you for participating in this conversation. I hope it's just one of many we'll
have over the coming years. Thank you very much.
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APPENDIX I
QUESTIONS FOR PROFESSOR ERiC FONER
1. You have written, "Reconstruction is the most controversial and mis-
understood period in all of American history."5 9 In the context of constitu-
tional interpretation, what are the implications of your observation?
2. In Michael J. Perry's 1999 book on the Fourteenth Amendment, he
quotes Raoul Berger that "[blecause the [Fourteenth] Amendment.. . furnishes
the chief fulcrum for [the Supreme Court's] control of controversial policies,
the question whether such control is authorized by the Constitution is of great
practical importance. "'6 0 Does the Fourteenth Amendment, in your view,
authorize federal courts' control of controversial policies; for example,
expanding defendants' criminal procedure rights, ordering desegregation, rul-
ing on the constitutionality of affirmative action, mandating the balance
between religious public observance in state public forums, and declaring that
there is a woman's right to privacy that encompasses the right to choose to
terminate a pregnancy?
3. Professor Perry also contends that the wave of "Klan lynchings and
private violence undeterred and unpunished by the state that characterized the
post-Civil War era is the paradigmatic Equal Protection violation, not Jim Crow
laws and segregated schools."6 1
a. Is Professor Perry right that states' failure to provide "equal protection" as to
already existing legal prohibitions on private wrongs was the paradigmatic wrong the
Fourteenth Amendment sought to address?
b. Did the Supreme Court basically ignore that paradigmatic state wrong, in United
States v. Morrison6 2 by not sufficiently giving the protection implicitly promised by
the law when it held that Congress could not "make a federal case" out of gender-
motivated violence (Cheryl Brzonkala's gang rape) under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment?
4. Senator Thaddeus Stevens, a key framer of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, observes Professor Perry, stated "that the amendment required that
whatever law protected the white should protect the black equally .... .63
Senator Stevens's statement is sometimes linked to Justice Harlan's assertion
that "[olur constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens. '"64
a. Some modem conservatives hook these statements together and contend that this
is evidence that the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment is contrary to modem
affirmative action programs in that they assess the qualifications of an individual
through race-conscious methods. What is a Reconstruction historian's response?
59 Foner, supra note 19.
60 PERRY, supra note 19, at 48 (quoting GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 1).
61 Id. at 54 (citing Robin West, Toward an Abolitionist Interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 111, 139 (1991)).
62 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
63 PERRY, supra note 19, at 55.
64 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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b. What is a Reconstruction historian's response to the "color blind" interpretation
of Equal Protection clause under Rehnquist Court case law? 65 To illustrate, in Shaw
v. Reno, 66 the Supreme Court held that race consciousness in drawing district lines
was unconstitutional because if race were to be a "predominant factor," race-neutral
districting principles (like geographic boundaries of communities or just plain polit-
ics) would become subordinated to racial considerations. 67 The Court held that race-
conscious line drawing requires heightened scrutiny because it is a constitutional
wrong for state actors to project onto racial minorities political predisposition merely
because of the color of their skin.68 Is the Rehnquist Court's "colorblindness" inter-
pretation of the Equal Protection clause consistent with how the framers viewed the
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment?
5. William Nelson, a Fourteenth Amendment historian, wrote:
In their efforts to elaborate a theory of equality, statesmen of the generation which
framed and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment faced [a difficult issue] that con-
tinue[s] to plague Fourteenth Amendment analysis today. [The issue], once they
moved beyond obviously defective racial criteria, was to distinguish classifications
that would be reasonable under the amendment from those that would be arbitrary.
In dealing with the ... issue, the congressional proponents of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment were always able to specify whether a particular classification was reasonable
or arbitrary. But they were persistently unable to elaborate how their conclusions
were derived from or compelled by their more general theory; they simply knew an
arbitrary exercise of power when they saw one.
69
a. Was the Fourteenth Amendment deliberately drafted to be so vague?
b. Does Professor Nelson's analysis reflect that equal status under law-not
necessarily "rights" or "liberty" as such-was the central value of the Four-
teenth Amendment?
70
6. Race theorists emphasize that the central purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to eliminate caste. Justice Harlan provides the most famous
statement of this principle, "in the view of the constitution, in the eye of the
law, there is in this country no superior, dominant ruling class of citizens.
There is no caste here."
7 1
A key concern of the Reconstruction Congress was to do away with the
Black Codes enacted in Southern states. The Slaughter House Cases make
reference to this enactment history in stating that "the [Fourteenth Amend-
ment's] lone pervading purpose" was the "freedom of the slave race, the secur-
ity and firm establishment of the freedom, and the protection of the newly made
freedman, and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exer-
cised unlimited dominion over him."
65 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 US 469, 493 (1988) (To whatever
racial group these citizens belong, their "personal rights" to be treated with equal dignity and
respect are implicated by a rigid rule erecting race as the sole criterion in an aspect of public
decision-making.).
66 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
67 Id. at 646-51.
68 Id. at 649.
69 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 138-39 (1988).
70 FONER, supra note 2, at 257-58 (1988).
71 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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However, might the enactment history also be consistent with reading the
anti-caste principle more broadly? For example in Romer v. Evans,72 Justice
Anthony Kennedy begins the opinion quoting Justice Harlan's anti-caste princi-
ple. Justice Kennedy argues that the heterosexual majority had used its politi-
cal power and majority numbers to enact a law that would have permanently
placed gay men and lesbians in a subordinate the civic status by preventing
them from petitioning local government for laws that would protect them from
discrimination. Such actions legitimized the majority group's animosity and
also stigmatized gay men and lesbians.7 3
a. Is such a broad reading of the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment consistent
with its history of enactment?
b. Did the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intend that any identifiable group,
who had been historically and socially discriminated, would come under the protec-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment?
c. Under such a view not only would gay men and lesbians come under the protec-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment but also conceivably aliens/noncitizens. Is such
an extension of the Fourteenth Amendment to a group, which courts view as standing
outside of the political community constituted by "We the People," consistent with
the Framers' intent or the broad purposes of the Fourteenths Amendment?
7. Professor Michael Perry asserts:
If Curtis and Amar (and others) are right, then, insofar as the original understanding of the
privileges or immunities provision is concerned, the answer to the question [of what rights
should be "incorporated"] is this: No state law regulates "for the public good in a reasonable
fashion"-no state law is "reasonably" designed to accomplish a legitimate governmental
purpose-if the law, were it a national law, would violate a right of citizens protected by the
Bill of Rights.
74
a. Do Law Professors Michael Kent Curtis and Ahkil Amar have the "incorporation
controversy" right?
b. Or does incorporation come about, as suggested by Professor Michael Perry,
logically because state laws that would violate the federal Bill of Rights are, virtually
by definition, denials of equal status under law?
8. In the Slaughter House Cases, Justice Field in dissent emphasized
Justice Washington's opinion in Corfield v. Coryell, and asserted that "[tlhat
only is a free government, in the American sense of the term, under which the
inalienable right of every citizen to pursue his happiness is unrestrained, except
by just, equal, and impartial laws."75 Was Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment intended to secure to "We the people" all their natural and inalien-
able rights-whether or not any one of them was specified in the text of the
Constitution?
9. As a historian what is your reaction to originalist theories of constitu-
tional interpretation?
10. Do courts ever do a good job of elucidating the "Framers' intent," or
applying competently historical context? Please provide examples of your
"best hits" or "worst hits."
72 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
73 Id. at 627.
74 PERRY, supra note 19, at 78.
15 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36 (1873).
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